It is patent to any intelligent person that different climates produce different fauna and flora. Why then should they not produce different kinds of people? -Wheeler, 1946, p. 80 All superiors are unequal, but some are more unequal than others. Cross-cultural differences in the use of superiority, power, orders, and close supervision are particularly intriguing. Why, for example, do superiors in Indonesia and Nigeria rely much less on their subordinates as sources of information, and as targets of delegation, than do superiors in Denmark and the Netherlands ( Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) ? Or, more generally, where on earth and why do leaders tend to overpower or empower the people they lead? Answers to such questions may help international human resource managers and interventionists, expatriates, and migrants anticipate and accept or to gradually induce change in the locally dominant relationships between superiors and subordinates.
In terms of Berry's (1997) ecocultural model, the present comparative study addresses the interactive impact of the ecological context of thermal climate and the sociopolitical context of national wealth on the society-level endorsement of an autocratic rather than democratic leadership culture. The conceptual part contains a definition and a brief country-level contextualization of effective autocratic leadership followed by an overview of the cultural, economic, and climatic explanations of cross-national differences in autocratic and democratic leadership that have been suggested so far. The gist of the argument is represented in five schematically interrelated hypotheses. The methodological and empirical parts contain descriptions of the measures used, the regression analyses applied, and the contextleadership links found. The concluding part contains a point-by-point discussion of the restricted scientific claims that can be made.
EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES AUTOCRATIC LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
Compared to democratic superiors, autocratic superiors act in more self-centered ways. They make decisions more unilaterally and supervise subordinates' work activities more closely (Muczyk & Reimann, 1987) . Given that organizations are embedded in widely different cultural environments, economic environments, and climatic environments (Parker, 1997) , it is unlikely that no worldwide differences in the endorsement, adoption, and perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership would occur. Whereas cross-national differences in the appreciation and implementation of autocratic and democratic leadership in organizations are indeed obvious and well documented (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 1999; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 1999; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) , their explanation has recently become a disputed issue. Is this unmistakable cross-national variation in the extent to which autocratic leadership in organizations is endorsed, expected, enacted, and accepted culture driven, economy driven, or climate driven, or is there another explanation?
CULTURAL EXPLANATION?
Here, borrowing from House et al. (1999) , culture refers to a set of "shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations" (p. 184). With regard to leadership, national culture is usually conceptualized and investigated as a set of independent variables and as having a pervasive influence on the leadership construals and leader behavior of its members. Hundreds of studies have shown that a country's culture helps to explain leadership construals (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2000; Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004; Gerstner & Day, 1994; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 1999; Schmidt & Yeh, 1992; Shaw, 1990; Wong & Birnbaum-More, 1994) , leader behavior (e.g., Smith, Peterson, & Misumi, 1994; Smith et al., 2002) , relations between leadership construals and leader behavior (e.g., Smith, Misumi, Tayeb, Peterson, & Bond, 1989) , relations between leader behavior and behavioral consequences (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Williams, Whyte, & Green, 1966) , and so forth. Now that so many studies have significantly advanced our understanding of leadership phenomena as consequences of national culture, the time is ripe for investigating common leadership construals in a country's organizations as cultural adaptations to noncultural contexts. Being realistic about what can be accomplished at any one time in an inquiry, I restricted myself to a historical economic explanation, two climatic explanations, and two climate-by-wealth explanations of autocratic leadership in organizations around the globe.
ECONOMIC EXPLANATION?
Only when humans changed their primary mode of subsistence from hunting animals to herding them and from gathering plants to cultivating them did autocratic leadership develop (Nolan & Lenski, 1999, pp. 103-109, 189-191) . The transition from sampling food to producing food and from a nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary lifestyle gradually reduced environmental complexity and uncertainty, thus allowing for more directive leadership (cf., Duncan, 1972; Mintzberg, 1979) . A powerful and often literate urban elite started to make the Van de Vliert / AUTOCRATIC LEADERSHIP WORLDWIDE 43 necessary economic decisions, to enforce implementation, and to autocratically control the economic surplus (e.g., Bibby, 1965; Lenski, 1966; Service, 1975) . The resulting agrarian societies were characterized by centralized authority, chief executive control, and vertical specialization anchored by a few "haves" and a huge majority of "have nots."
Even today, many countries with predominantly agrarian populations, including Albania, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Morocco, and Zambia, are still autocratically led, directly by members of a governing class (Karatnycky, 2001 ) and indirectly by collaborating retainers, clergymen, and merchants in organizations (Nolan & Lenski, 1999, p. 190) . As a likely consequence, through processes of socialization and internalization, superiors and subordinates in organizations in these industrializing agrarian societies have learned to value and practice the giving and obeying of orders and to view autocratic leadership as effective.
The next major transition, from agrarian society to industrial society, was and is, first of all, a matter of growing economic development and increasing socioeconomic complexity. Under these circumstances, organizational leaders can no longer adequately manage on their own and find it necessary to delegate decision-making discretion to others (Duncan, 1972; Mintzberg, 1979) . Indeed, growing development and increasing complexity tend to propel societies in the direction of higher income, better education, and more political and economic participation (United Nations Development Programme, 2001), as well as smaller power distances in organizations (Hofstede, 2001, p. 519) . This cluster of economy-driven trends tends to empower subordinates and, through it, makes top-down decision making and close supervision in their organizations less important, less feasible, and less effective (cf., Gerstner & Day, 1994; Hofstede, 2001; Leana, 1987; Sagie & Koslowsky, 2000) . Together, the agrarian and advanced industrial stages of societal development suggest that autocratic leadership will be seen as less effective and attractive in richer countries. This perspective led to the first hypothesis, representing the economic explanation.
Hypothesis 1: The perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is lower in richer countries.
CLIMATIC EXPLANATION?
Here, climate refers to the generalized cold or hot weather of an area. Whereas the weather changes continuously, climate has been extraordinarily stable for the past 10,000 years (Burroughs, 1997) . Whereas cold and hot weather tend to have immediate physiopsychological effects at the individual and organizational levels, cold and hot climates tend to have long-term macrosociological effects at the societal and global levels.
In the field of organizational behavior, Peterson and Smith (1997) have criticized Van de Vliert and Van Yperen (1996) for confusing weather effects and climatic effects on power distance and role overload. All of them can be criticized for making no distinction between geoclimatic effects and bioclimatic effects. Geoclimate, the mean temperature level, varies from cold at the icecaps to hot at the equator. Bioclimate, the average deviation from a comfortable temperature level, varies from harsh at latitudes closer to the icecaps (e.g., Canada, Finland), in countries with land climates (e.g., Austria, China), and in desert areas (e.g., Sudan, Niger) to temperate in countries with sea climates at latitudes closer to the equator (e.g., Costa Rica, Philippines). Besides, in geoclimate, equally large between-country differences in temperature have the same weight at all temperature levels, whereas in bioclimate, equally large between-country differences in temperature tend to weigh heavier at more 44 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY extreme temperature levels (cf., Parsons, 1993; Scholander, Hock, Walters, Johnson, & Irving, 1950) .
Although common autocratic and democratic leadership cultures in a country's organizations have been related to climate, theory building has so far been inaccurate and simplistic because no distinction was made between geoclimate and bioclimate, let alone between main and interactive effects of geoclimate and bioclimate on leadership. Following is an overview of the speculative parts of geoclimatic and bioclimatic explanations of leadership cultures, summarized in two hypotheses about cross-national differences in the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership. The subsequent sections contain two additional hypotheses representing interactive geoclimate-by-wealth and bioclimate-by-wealth explanations of autocratic leadership cultures.
Geoclimatic explanation. According to Hofstede (2001) , "a country's geographic position is a fundamental fact that is bound to have a strong effect on the subjective culture of its inhabitants, as this culture is shaped over many generations" (p. 116). For that reason, he was not surprised to find that geographic latitude as a rough global indicator of climate was negatively linked to cultural power distance, a conglomeration of autocratic and persuasive/ paternalistic leadership. Hofstede (2001, pp. 115-117) argued that the linear cold-hot difference in climate is at the beginning of a causal chain because warmer environments are less problematic and easier to cope with. In colder climates, survival and population growth are more dependent on human intervention in nature, with the complicating effects that there is more need for technology, more technological momentum for change, more two-way teaching, and more questioning of authority. In subtropical and tropical climates, by contrast, there is less need for human intervention and for technology, leading to a more static society in which teachers are omniscient and teaching is one way and to less questioning of authority.
Related studies of the association between geoclimate and power distance similarly showed that more tropical climates value power distance more and have more practices of power distance (Carl, Gupta, & Javidan, 2004) , that organizations in countries with colder climates are less centralized and less vertically differentiated, and that employees in colder countries attach greater importance to egalitarian commitment and autonomy (Van de Vliert & Van Yperen, 1996) . Together, these findings and speculative interpretations support the viewpoint that societies at higher latitudes have to cope with more complex climatic environments and, therefore, in line with Duncan's (1972) and Mintzberg's (1979) systemstheoretical framework, tend to disapprove of autocratic leadership to a greater extent. This notion that more complex colder environments decrease the endorsement and adoption of autocratic leadership led to the second hypothesis, representing the geoclimatic explanation.
Hypothesis 2: The perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is lower in countries with colder geoclimates.
Bioclimatic explanation. There is reason to expect that the negative relationship between climatic temperature and leadership in Hypothesis 2 is misleading because, like all warmblooded species, humans thrive in temperate climates. The colder or hotter the climate, the more adaptations are required. Acclimatization, that is, long-term adjustment in anatomy and physiology, is not enough (Parsons, 1993) . Climate-contingent needs for thermal comfort, nutrition, and health require that humans continuously use, adjust, and organize a variety of elements from their environment. Harsher-colder or hotter-climates require special clothing, housing, and working arrangements; special organizations for the production, transportation, trade, and storage of food; special care and cure facilities; and so forth (for some early formulations of the bioclimatic impact on organizational behavior, see McClelland, 1961, pp. 383-388; Triandis, 1973) .
Some large cross-national studies (Van de Vliert, 2003; Van de Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede, & Daan, 1999) reported a pattern of links between a country's bioclimate and its culture. Compared with employees in colder and hotter countries, employees in countries with temperate climates attach more importance to earnings, recognition, and mastery-oriented advancement and challenge than to good working relationships and desirable living conditions. The research team assumed that the greater investments in adapting to cold climates with prolonged winters and to hot climates with scorching summers have led to the development of cultural customs characterized by sacrifice, delay of gratification, and cooperation rather than more selfish cultural customs characterized by dominance and aggressive competition.
If these bioclimate-culture links rest on valid observations, autocratic leadership will be less appropriate and prevalent in organizations located in countries with harsher climates. In support of this expectation, Van de Vliert and Smith (2004) showed that organizational superiors in countries with more demanding-colder or hotter-climates adopted more democratic styles of leadership by relying more on their subordinates as sources of information and as targets of delegation. Taken together, these physiology-based considerations and empirical associations led to the third hypothesis, representing the bioclimatic explanation.
Hypothesis 3: The perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is lower in countries with more demanding-colder or hotter-bioclimates.
It is worth mentioning that support for Hypothesis 3 is independent of support for Hypothesis 2. If the curve between thermal climate and perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership has an upward slope, it supports Hypothesis 2 but not Hypothesis 3; if this curve has a predominantly upward slope ending in a downward slope, it supports both hypotheses; if this curve has a predominantly downward slope, it supports Hypothesis 3 but not Hypothesis 2.
CLIMATE-BY-WEALTH EXPLANATION?
Montesquieu (1748) was the first to recognize that atmospheric climate and national wealth may have joint effects on human functioning. The key breakthrough made by Montesquieu is the notion that income is generated not so much for income's sake but to satisfy climate-contingent human needs (Parker, 2000, pp. 24-26) . In essence, Montesquieu saw national wealth as a determinant of the link between climate and human perceptions and behavior. Affluence may indeed alter the impact of climate because capital goods can be exchanged for homeostatic goods in pursuit of overcoming or mitigating the hardships of harsh climates (Parker, 2000, pp. 132-135) . Hence, it is not inconceivable that climate and wealth have interactive effects on national culture in general and on the common leadership culture in a country's organizations in particular.
From this speculative climate-by-wealth perspective, Van de Vliert and Smith (2004) recently conducted two studies, a 54-nation comparison of 6,968 middle managers' reports of reliance on subordinates as sources of information and a 76-nation comparison of 12,557 top managers' reports of reliance on subordinates as targets of delegation. Twice they found 46 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY empirical support for a burgeoning climatic or ecological leadership theory that may be summarized in the following series of four cumulative propositions.
Demands proposition. Basic human needs for thermal comfort, nutrition, and health make life in colder or hotter climates more demanding than life in temperate climates. Colder or hotter climates entail nastier weather, a wider variety of thermoregulatory requirements and adjustments, greater relocation risks, less amenable vegetation, greater risks of food shortage and food spoilage, stricter diets, more health problems, and so forth (e.g., Parker, 2000; Parsons, 1993; Sachs, 2000; Triandis, 1973) .
Resources proposition. National wealth provides a populace with more personal and societal resources to meet the demands of a less temperate-colder or hotter-climate. As a rule, homeostatic goods, needed to secure thermal comfort, nutrition, and health, are for sale and have a price. Money and other capital goods can buy a wide variety of consumables, immovables, conveniences, appliances, recreational facilities, services, and practices that help meet the demands of extreme climates.
Match proposition. Greater climatic demands unmatched by wealth-based climatic resources require greater cognitive, affective, and behavioral investments in satisfying existence needs. The acquisition of homeostatic goods requires more selfish attention, anxiety, and labor at the expense of alternative investments in one's sociopsychological networks and functioning. Consequently, in conjunction with lower collective income, more demanding climates are expected to produce more selfish, if not competitive, cultures. In contrast, greater climatic demands matched by wealth-based climatic resources satisfy existence needs, thus allowing greater cognitive, affective, and behavioral investments in satisfying one's own and others' needs for relatedness, collaboration, and coordination. Consequently, in conjunction with higher collective income, more demanding climates are expected to produce more cooperative cultures.
Leadership proposition. Given that leaders in countries with more demanding climates unmatched by climatic resources tend to act in more selfish and competitive ways, they will consistently tend to adopt and endorse subordinate-oriented leadership to a lesser extent. Conversely, given that leaders in countries with more demanding climates matched by climatic resources tend to act in more cooperative ways, they will consistently tend to adopt and endorse subordinate-oriented leadership to a greater extent. In other words, different organizational leaders thrive in different climate-by-wealth niches on earth: autocratic leaders under circumstances of harshness and poverty, democratic leaders under circumstances of harshness and wealth, and moderately autocratic/democratic leaders in temperate climates irrespective of wealth.
This rudimentary leadership theory has been tested for the occurrence of democratic leadership under various bioclimatic conditions. The present study extends this line of research by testing whether the theory also holds for the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership. In addition, this study is the first to take into account that the theory can be tested for either increasingly cold or increasingly hot climates, yielding geoclimate-by-wealth explanations of leadership culture, or for both colder and hotter climates, yielding bioclimate-bywealth explanations of leadership culture. The geoclimate-by-wealth prediction in Hypothesis 4 qualifies Hypotheses 1 and 2, whereas the bioclimate-by-wealth prediction in Hypothesis 5 qualifies Hypotheses 1 and 3.
Hypothesis 4: The perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is lower in richer countries with more demanding-colder-geoclimates but higher in poorer countries with more demanding geoclimates. Hypothesis 5: The perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is lower in richer countries with more demanding-colder or hotter-bioclimates but higher in poorer countries with more demanding bioclimates.
INTERRELATIONS AMONG EXPLANATIONS
The main explanations of the cross-national differences in autocratic leadership culture can be further clarified using the two-by-two scheme in Table 1 . As indicated, the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership is neither economy driven nor climate driven if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, is one-sidedly economy driven if only Hypothesis 1 is supported, is one-sidedly climate driven if only Hypothesis 2 or Hypothesis 3 is supported, and is driven by climate and wealth in concert if either Hypothesis 4 or Hypothesis 5 is supported. Irrespective of whether the hypotheses are supported or rejected, autocratic leadership culture may still be driven by economic conditions other than national wealth, climatic conditions other than thermal climate, or the country's historical, political, institutional, and religious context (cf., Dorfman, 1996) .
METHOD SAMPLE
The study was a secondary analysis of survey data gathered by more than 170 researchers of Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE; for research details, see . The GLOBE group gathered data in 61 cultures, representing all major regions of the world. In three multicultural countries, more than one culture was sampled (East and West Germans, German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss, and White and Black South Africans). Within each culture, middle managers from domestic organizations in at least two target industries (food processing, financial services, and telecommunications services) were sampled (N = 17,370, range = 27 to 1,790 per culture, M = 285, SD = 237). Clearly, this sample is not representative of all cultures and countries. It does represent, however, a relevant range of variation in the environmental conditions of climate 48 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY and wealth (e.g., temperate/poor: Ecuador, Zambia; temperate/rich: New Zealand, Taiwan; demanding/poor: Kazakhstan, Turkey; demanding/rich: Germany, Slovenia) that might influence leadership construals and leader behavior in work settings.
MEASURES
Dependent variable: Autocratic leadership. The country-level GLOBE dimension used was the average perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership (reverse-scored secondorder factor of participative leadership; Dorfman et al., 2004, pp. 713-714; see also Den Hartog et al., 1999) . The measuring instrument was translated from English into the native language of the participating managers, then translated back into English by another person, and finally approved or corrected by two members of the GLOBE Coordinating Team. The managers rated how important each of 10 characteristics and behaviors is for a leader to be "exceptionally skilled at motivating, influencing, or enabling you, others, or groups to contribute to the success of the organization or task." The characteristics and behaviors presented were elitist, ruler, autocratic, dictatorial, domineering, bossy, nonegalitarian, nondelegator, micromanager, and individually oriented (1 = greatly inhibits a person from being an outstanding leader and 7 = contributes greatly to a person being an outstanding leader). The aggregatability (intraclass correlation [ICC] 1 = .20), internal consistency (Cronbach's α = .85), and interrater reliability (ICC 2 = .95) of this measurement scale are more than acceptable (Hanges & Dickson, 2004, pp. 132-137) .
To assess its construct validity, this estimate of autocratic leadership was shown to have relationships with increases in cultural power distance (r = .51, n = 52, p < .01; Hofstede, 2001, pp. 500-502) and with decreases in country-level leader reliance on subordinates as sources of information (r = -.45, n = 39, p < .01) and as targets of delegation (r = -.48, n = 51, p < .01; Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) . The fact that the GLOBE measure showed strong associations with these three different manifestations of hierarchical interaction reported by three different samples of organizational employees at three different points in time suggests that autocratic leadership is a robust syndrome of endorsing and adopting the use of superiority (elitist, ruler, nonegalitarian), power (dictatorial, domineering), orders (bossy, nondelegator), and close supervision (micromanager, individually oriented).
Although Hanges and Dickson (2004) demonstrated that response bias plays a minor role in the measurement of autocratic leadership, the country-level ratings may still reflect a stronger acquiescent response bias (Smith, 2004) . To eliminate such bias in scale use, I computed a mean score for GLOBE's other leadership measures-charismatic/value based, team oriented, humane oriented, autonomous, and self-protective-and another one for GLOBE's nine societal cultural values scales. "There is no substantive reason why these overall means should vary across nations. They therefore give an estimate of differences in how rating scales are used within each national sample" (Smith et al., 2002, p. 197) . The autocratic-leadership score was regressed onto the overall means, first for the scores on the other five leadership dimensions and then for the scores on the nine societal cultural values scales. The resulting dependent variables were almost identical (r = .95, n = 61, p < .001) and produced almost identical results. Results for autocratic leadership controlled for the average level of leadership are reported here because they provide the most conservative test of the hypotheses. The standardized residuals used for autocratic leadership ranged from -1.94 in Canada and -1.85 in Austria to 1.76 in Mexico and 2.33 in Qatar (for a listing of all values, see Table 2 ). Van Independent variable: Demanding geoclimate. Climate is typically estimated in degrees Celsius during a 30-year period. In countries with many major cities, multiple city averages, weighted for population, are used (Parker, 1997, pp. 203-226) . Because cold countries have much larger seasonal variations in temperature than warmer countries (r = -.82 for all countries and r = -.78 for the sample), the average temperature and the variation in temperature are potentially confounded variables. Geoclimate was therefore operationalized as the midrange temperature controlled for the winter-summer variation in temperature. Specifically, I used the standardized residual of the average of the lowest and highest temperatures in the coldest winter month and in the hottest summer month regressed on the standard deviation in these four temperature values (worldwide range = -3.37 to 2.63, sample range = -2.34 to 2.04; see Table 2 ).
Independent variable: Demanding bioclimate.
Bioclimates are more demanding to the extent that winters are cold, that summers are hot, or both. The reference point for a temperate climate, 22 o C, is not only the highest world temperature in the coldest winter month (on the Marshall Islands) and the lowest world temperature in the hottest summer month (on the Faroe Islands; Parker, 1997) , but it is also the approximate midpoint of the range of comfortable temperatures (cf., Parsons, 1993) . It is inadequate to describe the climate-demands relation using a linear rule. The geoclimatic difference between 20 o C and 15 o C, for example, produces a smaller difference in demands than does the geoclimatic difference between -15 o C and -20 o C (cf., Parsons, 1993; Scholander et al., 1950) . Therefore, demanding bioclimate was operationalized as the sum of the squared deviations from 22 o C for the lowest and highest temperatures in the coldest winter month and in the hottest summer month Van a. Standardized residual of participative leadership reversed (Dorfman et al., 2004, pp. 713-714) controlled for acquiescent response bias. b. Demanding geoclimate is the average of the lowest and highest temperatures in the coldest winter month and in the hottest summer month regressed on the standard deviation in these four temperature values, whereas demanding bioclimate is the sum of the squared deviations from 22 o C for these four temperature values (Parker, 1997, pp. 203-226) . National wealth is the gross national product per capita in U.S. dollars (Parker, 1997, pp. 45-70) .
(worldwide range = 146 to 5,777, M = 1,152, SD = 1,028; sample range = 327 to 4,231, M = 1,613, SD = 1,006; see Table 2 ).
It is important to note that the inaccurate measures of geoclimate and bioclimate in countries spanning a broad range of latitudes (e.g., Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Russia, and the United States) form a statistical rather than theoretical problem. By increasing the standard error of the mean and by masking regional within-country variations in climate, these measures produce conservative estimates of the impact of climate on leadership culture.
Independent variable: National wealth. As usual, to reduce the skew of the wealth distribution (worldwide range = $115 to $50,000; sample range = $314 to $33,200; Parker, 1997, pp. 47-70; see Table 2 ), wealth was operationalized as the natural logarithm of the countries' gross national product per capita in U.S. dollars (worldwide range = 4.74 to 10.82, M = 7.81, SD = 1.48; sample range = 5.75 to 10.41, M = 8.54, SD = 1.36). In the Results section, attention will be paid to the confounding relationship between national wealth and income equality (r = .63, n = 51, p < .001). Table 3 contains a listing of the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the variables used. In support of Hypothesis 1, autocratic leadership was seen as somewhat less effective in richer countries (r = -.25, p < .05). By contrast, there was no support for the expectations in Hypotheses 2 and 3 that autocratic leadership is endorsed less in countries with colder geoclimates (r = .22, ns) or in countries with less temperate-colder or hotterbioclimates (r = -.19, ns). A retest of Hypothesis 2, controlling for bioclimate, and a retest of Hypothesis 3, controlling for geoclimate, did not change the results because geoclimate and bioclimate are unrelated (r = -.20, ns).
RESULTS
To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, after standardizing the predictors, I entered geoclimate or bioclimate, wealth, and the climate-by-wealth interaction term in a hierarchical regression analysis. As reported in Table 4 , Model 1, the geoclimate-by-wealth composite did not predict the endorsement of autocratic leadership. Thus, the joint impact of geoclimate and wealth, as formulated in Hypothesis 4, received no support. In Model 2, a highly significant result surfaced for the interactive effect of bioclimate and wealth on the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership (∆R 2 = .19, Β = -.54, p < .001). As shown in Figure 1 , and in support of Hypothesis 5, autocratic leadership was seen as less effective in richer countries with more demanding-colder or hotter-bioclimates (simple slope r = -.54, n = 30, p < .001) but as more effective in poorer countries with more demanding bioclimates (simple slope r = .39, n = 31, p < .05). I conducted five supplementary analyses to check for possible hidden faults in the results. First, relying on values of tolerance (> .10) and variance inflation factors (< 10), there was no multicollinearity of the prediction terms. Second, relying on Cook's distance coefficients (D ranges from .00 to .43; M D = .02), there were no outliers either. Third, I paid attention to the confounded nature of relative poverty and communist past. When the nine countries with a (Parker, 1997, pp. 47-70) were removed or when communist past was statistically controlled for, the pattern of main and interactive effects of bioclimate and wealth did not change.
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Fourth, a series of regression analyses addressed the rival explanation that the results were produced by a covariate of national wealth-income equality within nations (Gini index; United Nations Development Programme, 2001, pp. 182-185) . Bioclimate (∆R 2 = .03, n = 51, ns), income equality (∆R 2 = .00, ns), and the bioclimate-by-equality interaction (∆R 2 = .18, p < .01) accounted for 21% of the variance in the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership. Autocratic organizational leadership was seen as less effective in countries with more demanding-colder or hotter-climates and more income equality (r = -.38, n = 34, p < .05) but as more effective in countries with more demanding climates and less income equality (r = .48, n = 17, p < .05).
Further analyses using bioclimate, wealth, and income equality in the first step and the two-way bioclimatic interaction terms in the second and third steps showed that the bioclimate-by-wealth interaction (∆R 2 = .17, p < .01) and the bioclimate-by-equality interaction (∆R 2 = .16, p < .01) shared 11% of the variance in the endorsement of autocratic leadership and had unique contributions as well (bioclimate-by-wealth ∆R 2 = .06, p < .05; bioclimate-by-equality ∆R 2 = .05, p < .07). The additional interaction effects of wealth-byequality and climate-by-wealth-by-equality did not reach significance. These results are in line with the theoretical point of departure that greater climatic demands matched by the omnipresence of wealth-based climatic resources make autocratic leadership less effective, whereas greater climatic demands unmatched by the omnipresence of wealth-based climatic resources make autocratic leadership more effective.
Last but not least, if the bioclimate-by-wealth explanation rests on solid grounds, it should hold especially true for the 49 societies in the northern hemisphere, which have more demanding bioclimates than the 12 societies in the southern hemisphere (M = 1,766 vs. M = 988; SD = 1,053 vs. SD = 387). To reduce the impact of the underrepresentation of southern hemisphere societies, each society's contribution to the regression equation was weighted (w north = 1; w south = 4). Together, the three predictors (bioclimate, wealth, and hemisphere), the three two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction accounted for 36% of the countrylevel variance in the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership. Most important, hemisphere had a strong main effect (∆R 2 = .15, = 0.86, p < .001) that was qualified by the threeway interaction of bioclimate, wealth, and hemisphere (∆R 2 = .05, Β = -1.00, p < .05). Visual inspection of the plots revealed that the bioclimate-by-wealth explanation did hold especially true for the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership in northern hemisphere organizations.
DISCUSSION PRELIMINARY NOTES ON CLIMATE-LEADERSHIP LINKS
The relationship between climate and leadership culture is a neglected, controversial, and complicated topic. Its neglect is apparent from the absence of studies of leadership and managerial behavior in an interdisciplinary listing of 3,307 publications about thermal weather effects and climatic effects on individual, social, and economic behavior (Parker, 1995) . This undoubtedly reflects the complexity of the country-level connections between climate and cultural leadership syndromes. Climatic effects on leadership culture, if any, are long-term 54 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY effects that are difficult to trace accurately, with the consequence that unknown alternative explanations of these effects cannot be excluded convincingly. Indeed, the observed interactive effect of demanding climate and national wealth on the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership in no way proves that the bioclimate-by-wealth composite causes the endorsement of autocratic leadership in organizational settings. What claims, then, can be made on the basis of the theoretical and empirical study reported here?
CONCLUDING CLAIMS OR FOLLOWING QUESTIONS?
My first claim is that the country-level endorsement and adoption of autocratic leadership in organizations does not happen by chance. The systematic and robust nature of differences in power distance (Hofstede, 2001; , aversion to participative and delegative leadership (Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) , and importance of autocratic leadership skills (this study) leads me to believe that there must be a reason for this pattern of findings. Indeed, it is implausible that autocratic leadership in organizations has a kind of ecological niche in richer countries with less demanding bioclimates (e.g., Hong Kong and Qatar) and in poorer countries with more demanding bioclimates (e.g., Georgia and Poland) for no reason other than sheer coincidence.
My second claim is that to avoid tautological reasoning, meaningful relations between national culture and organizational leadership culture (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2000; Dorfman et al., 2004; House et al., 1999; Schmidt & Yeh, 1992; Shaw, 1990; Wong & Birnbaum-More, 1994) should be used to describe rather than explain cross-national differences in organizational leadership (cf., Hofstede, 2001, p. 388) . The paragraph on the construct validity of the dependent variable showed that cultural power distance correctly predicts the appreciation of autocratic leadership, but predicted variance is not the same as explained variance. Correctly predicted variance provides a framework for characterizing observations, such as culture-leadership links; only theory supplies the explanation of the observations ( Van de Vliert, 1997, pp. 19-23; Whetten, 1989) . As a consequence, instead of answering a question, the second claim prompts a further question: What theory can explain the pattern of characterizations of autocratic leadership in terms of bioclimate and wealth?
My third claim is that if bioclimate and socioeconomic development do drive crossnational differences in the endorsement of autocratic leadership in organizations, they do so in concert. This interaction effect rejects simplistic explanations of the unfolding world map of leadership in terms of climate (Hofstede, 2001; Van de Vliert & Van Yperen, 1996) , socioeconomic development from agrarian to industrial societies (Nolan & Lenski, 1999) , or socioeconomic regression through communist rule (this study). Instead, the results of the study just reported seem to support Montesquieu's (1748) in hindsight visionary model of how atmospheric climate and national wealth interact to influence human functioning.
My fourth claim is that the climate-by-wealth composite is a viable predictor of organizational differences in the perceived effectiveness of autocratic leadership around the globe only if the predictions are based on each country's deviation from a comfortable temperature level-bioclimatic cold or heat-and not on each country's mean temperature levelgeoclimate. The importance of this conclusion should not be underestimated as bioclimate and geoclimate are potentially confounded variables. Given that the bioclimatic deviations in winter and summer are larger in countries with colder geoclimates, it is surprising that no prior study has ever modeled and analyzed bioclimate and geoclimate in parallel (for research overviews, see Parker, 1995 Parker, , 2000 . Van de Vliert / AUTOCRATIC LEADERSHIP WORLDWIDE 55 My final claim is that mismatches of bioclimatic demands and climatic resources (demanding/poor) are positively linked to the endorsement of self-centered autocratic leadership, whereas matches of bioclimatic demands and climatic resources (demanding/rich) have negative links. These findings, represented in Figure 1 , seem to fit in with the accumulating evidence that bioclimate and wealth operate as double-edged swords. To date, the "egoistic" impact of bioclimate-wealth mismatches and the "altruistic" impact of bioclimate-wealth matches have been demonstrated for participative leadership (Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) , delegative leadership ( Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) , motives for volunteer work (Van de Vliert, Huang, & Levine, 2004) , and competitiveness versus altruism (Van de Vliert, Huang, & Parker, 2004, Study 2) . Although the current study in no way demonstrates that climate and wealth drive autocratic leadership culture, this expanding set of internally consistent observations makes it less self-evident to continue to interpret the findings in terms of climatic covariation rather than climatic causation. Do descriptive and predictive matches of bioclimatic demands and climatic resources have explanatory power after all?
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
This investigation was not without inherent strengths and weaknesses as a result of the methods employed. The strength of contrasting cultural explanation and explanation of culture came with the weakness of leaving multiple historical, political, institutional, and religious explanations of autocratic leadership culture out of consideration. The strength of a large sample of 61 cultures came with the weakness of a conveniently available sample, offering no conclusive evidence for cross-national generalization. The strength of distinguishing between geoclimate and bioclimate was connected with the weakness of leaving equally basic parameters, such as air movement and humidity, out of consideration. Finally, the strength of modeling winter and summer temperature extremes came with the weakness of a restriction of range on the hot side. The winter and summer proportions of the bioclimatic predictor used show that harsh winters have an overall weight of .68, whereas harsh summers have an overall weight of .32; this deserves further attention.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The wealth-dependent distribution of autocratic leadership construals over the cold, temperate, and hot zones of the earth, together with similar work on sociopsychological functioning ( Van de Vliert, Huang, & Levine, 2004; Van de Vliert, Huang, & Parker, 2004; Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004) , points to the viability of bioclimatic theories on global variation in human behavior. Although the bioclimatic leadership theory in question is descriptive and predictive rather than explanatory, colleagues with an ecological orientation will no doubt read it as providing a superior strategy for understanding the behavior of individuals and the evolution of cultural forms because it adopts an etic, scientific approach with a solid starting point in invariant laws of nature and the relationship among nature, human subsistence techniques, and the adaptation of societal and psychological characteristics to these exigencies. (Gabrenya, 1999, pp. 339-340) lenged to upgrade the bioclimatic propositions from a descriptive and predictive theory to an explanatory theory, to investigate whether changes in national wealth produce changes in leadership culture, to contextualize lower level theories of leadership construals and leader behavior, and to investigate the generalizability of the leadership theory to a larger set of management practices. International human resource managers and interventionists can no longer take it for granted that autocratic and democratic leadership approaches are equally malleable in any direction anywhere. Instead, organization experts might have to come to grips with different climate-by-wealth niches of leadership culture around the globe.
